A SURVEY OF CONTRACT THEORY-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN IN WIRELESS NETWORKS

作者:Zhang, Yanru*; Pan, Miao; Song, Lingyang; Dawy, Zaher; Han, Zhu
来源:IEEE Wireless Communications, 2017, 24(3): 80-85.
DOI:10.1109/MWC.2017.1500371WC

摘要

The prevalence of high performance mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets has brought fundamental changes to existing wireless networks. The growth of multimedia and location-based mobile services has exponentially increased network congestion and the demands for more wireless access. This has led to the development of advanced techniques to address the resulting challenges based on the concept of cooperation in various heterogeneous network scenarios. Thus, innovative incentive mechanisms in wireless networks are needed to ensure the participation of third party nodes, such as access points, small cells, and users. In this tutorial, we demonstrate the effectiveness of contract theory to design incentive mechanisms for a wide range of application scenarios in wireless networks. In contract theory, participants are offered properly designed rewards based on their performances to encourage better participation. First, we present an overview of basic concepts and models of contract theory, with comparisons to other related methods from economics. We then discuss incentive mechanisms, with a focus on the design of rewards in a contract. We demonstrate how contract theory can be utilized for developing effective incentive mechanisms for emerging wireless network scenarios such as traffic offloading, mobile crowdsourcing, and spectrum trading.