科研之友
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摘要
In the public goods games, players attempt to optimize their payo. s, following as fair, generous, and extortionate rules according to the pattern needed for obtaining their expected profits compared to those of their opponents. In first type of rule (the fair one), players seek equal profits of the opponent, and the generous rule induces to lower payo. than that of opposite players, while the extortionate rule leads to higher payo. s than that of their opponents. To model the three types of behaviors, we introduce a conditional strategy with a parameter., which control conditions of existence of the three behaviors. Therefore, players may contribute in a group, but may not contribute in the other group, because it depends on conditions of their opponents. Simulation results show that there exists a pure cooperation state when parameter. is moderate, even for a lower multiplication factor. Because conditional players cautiously contribute they can form compact clusters to prevent the invasion of defection and finally spread the cooperation when defectors die out.
