An evolutionary game theory model of binary opinion formation

作者：Ding Fei^*; Liu Yun; Shen Bo; Si Xia Meng

来源：Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications , 2010, 389(8): 1745-1752.

DOI：10.1016/j.physa.2009.12.028

• Opinion formation
• Game theory
• Cooperative game
• Minority game

A basic characteristic of most opinion models is that people lend to agree or compromise in the opinion interaction. which could be hopefully described by cooperative games in the evolutionary game theory framework. This paper presents game theory methods to model the formation of binary opinions. cooperative games are proposed to model the interaction rules of general people who lend to find an agreement, minority games are proposed to model the behaviors of contrarians; opinion preference is considered by varying the payoff Values The Majority Voter model could be restored from the proposed games. The game theory models Show evolutionary results similar to traditional opinion models Specially, the evolution of opinions with consideration of contrarians is in accordance with the Galam model. Furthermore. Influences of evolving rule. network topology and initial distribution of

• 出版日期2010-4-15
• 单位北京交通大学