摘要

Compared to Western countries, China's provision of affordable housing mainly focuses on supply-side subsidies. In China, the provision of affordable housing highly depends on local governments' impetus. While this, on one hand, ensures the stable provision of such housing, on the other hand, the model is disadvantageous since local governments have great discretionary power in the construction of affordable housing. Driven by economic interests, local governments often construct high-capacity affordable housing communities in remote locations, thus potentially distorting the ambitious aims and principles of China's affordable housing scheme. The empirical findings of this paper confirm that this particular spatial distribution of affordable housing has negatively affected the social interactions and life chances of its users. The key reasons behind these negative effects were found to be primarily economic motivations of local governments to construct such housing, including reducing their losses in land finance, maintaining high housing prices in central areas, pushing the price of urban land, and promoting urbanization.