An ecumenical response to color contrast cases

作者：Roberts Pendaran^*

来源：Synthese, 2017, 194(5): 1725-1742.

DOI：10.1007/s11229-016-1016-1

• Color contrast
• Incompatibility
• Objectivism
• Realism

Intrapersonal variation due to color contrast effects has been used to argue against the following intuitive propositions about the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color of the same grade all over at the same time (Incompatibility); external objects are actually colored (Realism); and the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism). In this article, I provide a defense of Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism from intrapersonal variation arguments that rely on color contrast effects. I provide a novel, ecumenical response to such arguments according to which typical variants are right, and which respects Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism, using the thesis that the colors of objects depend on the colors of objects in their surrounds.

• 出版日期2017-5