Airport capacity choice under airport-airline vertical arrangements

作者：Xiao, Yibin; Fu, Xiaowen^*; Zhang, Anming

来源：Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice , 2016, 92: 298-309.

DOI：10.1016/j.tra.2016.06.012

• Airport capacity
• Airport-airline vertical arrangement
• Demand uncertainty

This study investigates the effects of airport-airline vertical arrangements on airport capacity choices under demand uncertainty. A multi-stage game is analysed, in which competing airlines contribute to capacity investments and share airport revenues. Our analytical results suggest that for a profit-maximising airport, such a vertical arrangement leads to higher capacity but may not increase its profit, whereas for a welfare-maximising airport, such an arrangement has no effect on capacity or welfare. Capital cost savings brought by airport-airline cooperation, if any, always lead to higher capacity, and to higher profit for a profit-maximising airport and higher welfare for a welfare-maximising airport. Numerical simulations reveal that win-win outcomes may be achieved for an airport and its airlines without government intervention.

• 出版日期2016-10
• 单位电子科技大学