A Game Theoretic Framework for Bandwidth Allocation and Pricing in Federated Wireless Networks

作者：Gu Bo^*; Yamori Kyoko; Xu Sugang; Tanaka Yoshiaki

来源：IEICE - Transactions on Communications, 2012, E95B(4): 1109-1116.

DOI：10.1587/transcom.E95.B.1109

• pricing
• wireless access
• hotspots
• ubiquitous
• mobility
• roaming
• game theory
• auction
• equilibrium

With the proliferation of IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks, large numbers of wireless access points have been deployed, and it is often the case that a user can detect several access points simultaneously in dense metropolitan areas. Most owners, however, encrypt their networks to prevent the public from accessing them due to the increased traffic and security risk. In this work, we use pricing as an incentive mechanism to motivate the owners to share their networks with the public, while at the same time satisfying users' service demand. Specifically, we propose a "federated network" concept, in which radio resources of various wireless local area networks are managed together. Our algorithm identifies two candidate access points with the lowest price being offered (if available) to each user. We then model the price announcements of access points as a game, and characterize the Nash Equilibrium of the system. The efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium solution is evaluated via simulation studies as well.

• 出版日期2012-4