科研之友
微信
新浪微博
Facebook
分享链接
摘要
Economic development and sustainable ecological and environmental development generally target different goals, and there are trade-offs and game-like behaviors between implementers and donors in reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD +) program. This paper analyzed the effects of evolutionary behaviors of REDD+ implementers and donors with respect to environmental service payments. Within a theoretical analysis framework, the evolutionary stable strategies of the implementers and donors under different contractual payments for ecosystem services (PES) scenarios are analyzed to explore contractual REDD + payments through evolutionary game models. On this basis, anon-parametric local regression approach is used to analyze arrange of market-based contractual PES schemes in five REDD+ countries (Congo, Brazil, Ecuador, Nepal and Uganda). The results show the following: First, when the opportunity costs are less than the environmental benefits, some middle and high income developing countries are sufficiently incentivized to conserve forests, even without formal contractual PES scheme. This conservation occurs regardless of whether the industrialized countries will pay for the ecosystem services. Second, when the opportunity costs are greater than the environmental benefits, developing countries will generally not take the initiative to conserve forests when industrialized countries do not pay for the associated ecosystem services. Third, when there are enough contractual PES fines, developing countries will conserve forests, and the industrialised countries will pay for the ecosystem services. Finally, contractual PES fines are related to the costs of reducing emissions. Nepal has the largest marginal effect, and Uganda has the smallest. These results have implications for REDD+ program design and implementation: market-based contractual PES scheme should be given priority to regulate behavior of industrialized countries and developing countries in the PES scheme. Developing a targeted and differentiated contractual PES scheme requires an accounting of emission reduction costs in different countries.
