A many-to-many %26apos;rural hospital theorem%26apos;

作者：Klijn Flip^*; Yazici Ayse

来源：Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014, 54: 63-73.

DOI：10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.09.003

• Matching
• Many-to-many
• Stability
• Rural hospital theorem

We show that the full version of the so-called %26apos;rural hospital theorem%26apos; generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents%26apos; preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to hold.

• 出版日期2014-10