摘要

In January 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled that suggestive identification procedures violate a defendant's rights to due process only if law enforcement officials orchestrated the suggestive procedures. The Court's decision in Perry v. New Hampshire (Perry v. New Hampshire, No. 10-8974, 565 U.S. _ , 2012) dealt a serious blow to scholars who had contributed to the impressive advances of eyewitness memory research in the 34 years since the Court's last major statement on eyewitness testimony. In particular, it seemed as though the Court ignored the intervening years and the myriad scientific studies that had been conducted in that time. How could the Court be so blind? In what follows, we review both the scientific research on eyewitness memory and the Court's constitutional jurisprudence as it relates to eyewitness testimony and evidentiary due-process concerns. Together, we show that, although the Court may have seemingly ignored decades of scientific research, the question presented by Perry required the Court to remain true to existing due-process jurisprudence. We conclude by reviewing the limits of the Perry decision as well as a discussion of what the future may hold for the intersection of eyewitness memory research and constitutional interpretation.

  • 出版日期2013-8

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