A Carnivorous Rejoinder to Bruers and Erdos

作者：Hsiao Timothy^*

来源：Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2015, 28(6): 1127-1138.

DOI：10.1007/s10806-015-9582-7

• Animal ethics
• Moral status
• Sentience
• Sentiocentrism
• Veganism
• Vegetarianism

In an earlier paper, I defended the moral permissibility of eating meat against sentience-based arguments for moral vegetarianism. The crux of my argument was that sentience is not an intrinsically morally salient property, and that animals lack moral status because they lack a root (basic) capacity for rational agency. Accordingly, it is morally permissible to consume meat even if doing so is not strictly necessary for our nutrition. This paper responds to critiques of my argument by Bruers (J Agric Environ Ethics 28(4):705-717, 2015) and Erdos (J Agric Environ Ethics, 2015). I then show that their criticisms are easily dispatched and therefore fail to undermine my defense of meat consumption.

• 出版日期2015-12