A foundation for presentism

作者：Pezet Robert E^*

来源：Synthese, 2017, 194(5): 1809-1837.

DOI：10.1007/s11229-016-1024-1

• Change
• Ontological Realism
• Presentism
• Tense
• Triviality

Presentism states that everything is present. Crucial to our understanding of this thesis is how we interpret the 'is'. Recently, several philosophers have claimed that on any interpretation presentism comes out as either trivially true or manifestly false. Yet, presentism is meant to be a substantive and interesting thesis. I outline in detail the nature of the problem and the standard interpretative options. After unfavourably assessing several popular responses in the literature, I offer an alternative interpretation that provides the desired result. This interpretation is then used to clarify the distinction between 'real change' from mere variation and temporal relativisation. Reflecting on my solution, I try to diagnose the source of confusion over these issues. Then, building upon Fine's (Modality and tense, 2005) distinction between ontic and factive presentism, I elucidate what the presentist thesis specifically concerns and how best to formalise it. In the process I distinguish a weak and strong (extended) version of the presentist thesis. Finally, I end by drawing out some limitations of the paper.

• 出版日期2017-5