摘要
This paper sets out a semantics for C.I. Lewis%26apos;s logic S2 based on the ontology of his 1923 paper Facts, Systems, and the Unity of the World%26apos;. In that article, worlds are taken to be maximal consistent systems. A system, moreover, is a collection of facts that is closed under logical entailment and conjunction. In this paper, instead of defining systems in terms of logical entailment, I use certain ideas in Lewis%26apos;s epistemology and philosophy of logic to define a class of models in which systems are taken to be primitive elements but bear certain relations to one another. I prove soundness and completeness for S2 over this class of models and argue that this semantics makes sense of at least a substantial fragment of Lewis%26apos;s logical theory.
- 出版日期2013-2-1