Do Nonprofits Treat Their Employees Differently? Incentive Pay and Health Benefits

作者：Chen Xinxiang^*; Ren Ting; Knoke David

来源：Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 2014, 24(3): 285-306.

DOI：10.1002/nml.21093

• intrinsic motivation
• ownership
• agency theory
• health benefits
• performance-based incentives

We examine how nonprofit, public, and for-profit establishments vary in the provision of health benefits and insurance and performance-based incentives using the 2002 National Organization Survey of establishments in the United States. We found that in comparison to for-profit firms, both nonprofit and public organizations are less likely to use performance-based incentives, although they provide their employees with better health benefits and insurance. Sectoral differences in the provision of health benefits and insurance and use of performance-based incentives persist after controlling for correlates of sector that predict these outcomes, including establishment size, independence of establishment, market competition, establishment age, and unionization. We also found trade-offs between the provision of health benefits and insurance and use of performance-based incentives. Our results are generally consistent with the prediction from agency theory and also consistent with a view that public and nonprofit organizations are more concerned with the well-being of their employees.

• 出版日期2014
• 单位北京大学