Audit committee equity holdings, the risk of reporting problems, and the achievement of earnings thresholds

作者：MacGregor Jason^*

来源：Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2012, 31(5): 471-491.

DOI：10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.08.001

There is conflicting evidence on whether audit committee equity holdings enhance or undermine committee effectiveness. Some researchers contend that equity holdings motivate audit committees to minimize the risk of reporting problems, while others believe equity holdings align the committees' incentives with management. To reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions, I hypothesize that the influence of audit committee equity holdings depends upon the risk of reporting problems. I contend that when the risk of reporting problems is low (high) equity holdings motivate audit committees to give managers greater (less) discretion over reporting policies because the expected benefits from giving the discretion is greater (less) than the expected cost of the reporting problems that might occur from giving the discretion. I test whether the influence of audit committee equity holdings varies with the risk of reporting problems using a sample of 1370 firm-observations with earnings near the prior year's earning level and a sample of 2389 firm-observations near analyst forecasts. I find the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets the prior year's earnings level varies with the CEO's equity incentives and the level of high-risk assets. I also find the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets analysts' forecast varies with the CEO's equity incentives and the effectiveness of internal controls. Collectively, my results suggest equity holdings enhance audit committee effectiveness by increasing a committee's responsiveness to risk factors.

• 出版日期2012-10