'Good Sense' in context: A response to Kidd

作者：Ivanova Milena^*

来源：Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2011, 42(4): 610-612.

DOI：10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.09.006

• David Stump
• Good sense
• Pierre Duhem
• Virtue epistemology

In his response to my (2010), Ian Kidd claims that my argument against Stump's interpretation of Duhem's concept of 'good sense' is unsound because it ignores an important distinction within virtue epistemology. In light of the distinction between reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemology, Kidd argues that Duhem can be seen as supporting the latter, which he further illustrates with a discussion of Duhem's argument against 'perfect theory'. I argue that no substantive argument is offered to show that the distinction is relevant and can establish that Duhem's 'good sense' can be understood within responsibilist virtue epistemology. I furthermore demonstrate that Kidd's attempt to support his contention relies on a crucial misreading of Duhem's general philosophy of science, and in doing so highlight the importance of understanding 'good sense' in its original context, that of theory choice.

• 出版日期2011-12