A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share

作者：Athanassoglou Stergios^*; Brams Steven J; Sethuraman Jay

来源：Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, 60(3): 191-195.

DOI：10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.003

• Partnership dissolution
• Double auction
• Ex-post efficiency

We study the problem of dissolving a partnership when agents have unequal endowments. Agents bid on the price of the entire partnership. The highest bidder is awarded the partnership and buys out her partners' shares at a per-unit price that is a function of the two highest bids. We show that there exists no price-setting mechanism satisfying certain mild regularity properties that is ex-post efficient, for any common prior of valuations. This result sharply contrasts the equal-endowment case in which efficient dissolution of the sort we are examining is possible through a simple k-double auction, as suggested by Cramton et al. (1987).

• 出版日期2010-11