A Randomized Countermeasure Against Parasitic Adversaries in Wireless Sensor Networks

作者：Papadimitratos Panagiotis^*; Luo Jun; Hubaux Jean Pierre

来源：IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2010, 28(7): 1036-1045.

DOI：10.1109/JSAC.2010.100908

• Confidentiality
• Security
• Probabilistic Key Refreshing and En-route Encryption
• GossiCrypt

Due to their limited capabilities, wireless sensor nodes are subject to physical attacks that are hard to defend against. In this paper, we first identify a typical attacker, called parasitic adversary, who seeks to exploit sensor networks by obtaining measurements in an unauthorized way. As a countermeasure, we first employ a randomized key refreshing: with low communication cost, it aims at confining (but not eliminating) the effects of the adversary. Moreover, our low-complexity solution, GossiCrypt, leverages on the large scale of sensor networks to protect data confidentiality, efficiently and effectively. GossiCrypt applies symmetric key encryption to data at their source nodes; and it applies re-encryption at a randomly chosen subset of nodes en route to the sink. The combination of randomized key refreshing and GossiCrypt protects data confidentiality with a probability of almost 1; we show this analytically and with simulations. In addition, the energy consumption of GossiCrypt is lower than a public-key based solution by several orders of magnitude.

• 出版日期2010-9
• 单位南阳理工学院