Analysis of organizational conflict for Chinese construction enterprises

作者：Liu Dehai; Wang Weigu; Li Chunqing; Yu Yang

来源：International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management, 2007-08-21 to 2007-08-22.

• construction enterprise
• organizational conflict
• evolutionary game
• objective subgame model
• harmonious organization

Along with the end of WTO interim, the Chinese construction enterprises face the more intense competition in me production quality control and invite public bidding. Currently lots of organizations conflicts happen in the Chinese construction enterprise such as the wage payment default to peasant workers, because some social mechanisms are imperfect including the social security system, negotiation system among the different classes, social credit system and so on. Some existing theoretical papers used the traditional game theory to analyze the different strategies between the labor union and enterpriser, but now the Chinese construction enterprises are universally short of independent labor union where the peasant workers is a dispersive population. The paper uses the objective subgame model, in evolutionary game theory to analyze the engender reason, the emerging form, the escalation route and the management principle and occasion to build a positive conflict harmonious organization.

• 出版日期2007
• 单位东北财经大学