Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market

作者：Yu, Ying^*; Jin, Tongdan; Zhong, Chunjie

来源：Energies, 2015, 8(12): 14197-14218.

DOI：10.3390/en81212419

• stackelberg game
• Q-learning
• multi-agent simulation
• electricity market
• incentive mechanism

This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO) and multiple power generating companies (GenCos). Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.

• 出版日期2015-12
• 单位上海大学