An NTU value under complement reduced game

作者：Hwang Yan An^*

来源：International Journal of Game Theory, 2009, 38(3): 305-324.

DOI：10.1007/s00182-009-0155-8

• NTU value
• Complement reduced game

The paper follows Kalai and Samet's (Econometrica 53:307-327, 1985) construction to define a possible extension of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) to games without transferable utilities. We offer a characterization of the EANSC based on the axiom of independence of irrelevant monotonic transformation [Chang and Hwang (Int J Game Theory 32:253-271, 2003) introduced this axiom, and they named it independence of irrelevant expansions. The referee points out that the terminology is inappropriate. So, we change the name.] introduced by Chang and Hwang (Int J Game Theory 32:253-271, 2003) as well as on several familiar axioms. Specifically, we show that the EANSC is the only solution to satisfy Pareto optimality, translation covariance, anonymity, TU-bilateral consistency (or TU-converse consistency), aggregate monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant monotonic transformation.

• 出版日期2009-11
• 单位东华大学