Anti-psychologism about Necessity: Friedrich Albert Lange on Objective Inference

作者:Patton Lydia*
来源:History and Philosophy of Logic, 2011, 32(2): 139-152.
DOI:10.1080/01445340.2010.541183

摘要

In the nineteenth century, the separation of naturalist or psychological accounts of validity from normative validity came into question. In his 1877 Logical Studies (Logische Studien), Friedrich Albert Lange argues that the basis for necessary inference is demonstration, which takes place by spatially delimiting the extension of concepts using imagined or physical diagrams. These diagrams are signs or indications of concepts' extension, but do not represent their content. Only the inference as a whole captures the objective content of the proof. Thus, Lange argues, the necessity of an inference is independent of psychological accounts of how we grasp the content of a proposition.

  • 出版日期2011
  • 单位Virginia Tech; 美国弗吉尼亚理工大学(Virginia Tech)