A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences

作者：Sethuraman Jay^*; Ye Chun

来源：Operations Research Letters, 2015, 43(3): 283-287.

DOI：10.1016/j.orl.2015.02.010

• Random assignment
• Probabilistic serial mechanism
• Fairness
• Efficiency

Motivated by a problem of scheduling unit-length jobs with weak preferences over time-slots, the random assignment problem is considered on a uniform preference domain. It is shown that the natural extension of the probabilistic serial mechanism to the domain of weak, but uniform, preferences fails strategy-proofness, but so does every other mechanism that is ordinally efficient and treats equals equally. If envy-free assignments are required, any ex-post efficient (probabilistic or deterministic) mechanism must fail even a weak form of strategy-proofness.

• 出版日期2015-5