A GAME THEORETIC OPTIMIZATION MODEL BETWEEN PROJECT RISK SET AND MEASURE SET

作者：Zhao Lindu^*; Jiang Yiping

来源：International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making, 2009, 8(4): 769-786.

DOI：10.1142/S0219622009003697

• Project management
• risk control
• risk management
• Nash equilibrium
• game theory

Project risk management, as a subjective and dynamic decision method of avoiding project risk, plays an important role in selecting appropriate control measures (i.e. measure set) to handle multiple emerging risks (i.e. risk set). This paper focuses on the multirisk control problem under the condition of finite risk management resources. Based on the description of a Multi-HUB network and a collaboration mechanism within project risk management system, a multi-risk control system is formulated as a non-cooperative complete information game model between the project risk set and the measure set. In the proposed model, each risk within the risk set is described as a player in the game, who is competing with other players for the allocation of risk control resources that are available in limited quantities within a given measure set. Then an efficient algorithm is proposed to solve the allocation solution based on Nash equilibrium, and an experiment is presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed game model. The proposed modeling and solution methods can be used to support decision-making in project risk management.

• 出版日期2009-12
• 单位东南大学