科研之友
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摘要
Incentives to encourage the uptake of renewable energy generation have fostered wind energy in many power systems. These incentives usually take the form of market instruments (e.g., feed-in tariff or premium) that are not directly amenable to optimization representations of the market. In this paper, we propose an equilibrium model of the short-term market to address the impact of wind operation under different structural assumptions. The model is formulated for several price taking, risk averse firms in competition. It accounts for wind generation uncertainty and embeds a representation of the day ahead and balancing mechanisms. The consumer is modeled by a linear inverse demand function. We focus on feed-in premium as the incentive to wind as this is the instrument most favored today in European discussions. The model is formulated as a stochastic equilibrium problem where the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions from the optimization problem of each firm are simultaneously solved together with market clearing conditions on energy, capacity for reserve and energy for reserve. The problem for each firm consists of a two-stage stochastic optimization problem with a recourse function based on the conditional value at risk (CVaR(theta)) as a risk measure. Due to price taking assumptions the model is a single stage complementarity problem; it is implemented and solved using the software GAMS. An example based on a stylized simplification of the Spanish power market and motivated by the impact of wind penetration on the revenue of conventional plants is used to illustrate the proposed approach.
- 出版日期2015-1
