科研之友
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摘要
Drawbacks of traditional "rate of return" (ROR) regulation for distribution system operators (DSOs) have given birth to performance based regulations (PBRs), among which are price cap (PC), yardstick competition (YC), and quality regulation (QR). The PC method may be affected by information asymmetries between the regulator and DSOs and the integration of YC, a regulatory policy that makes the regulated DSO competing with a virtual competitor, partly solves this problem. QR also needs to be considered to ensure that the improvement of economics does not jeopardize quality. Thus, it seems appropriate to integrate the three PBRs to strive contemporaneously for economic and technical good performance. This paper aims to model the distribution system competition under the integrated PC, YC, and QR regulatory scheme, allowing for quantitative estimation of DSO's performance. We develop a comprehensive model to represent virtual competition under the integrated regulatory paradigm, capable of capturing the interaction among various DSOs, which is modeled as a Nash game where all the DSOs endeavor to reduce cost for profit maximization. The model is used to capture the impacts of various parameters on the technical and economic performances. An application of the model to real 5-DSOs case is provided and discussed.
- 出版日期2011-1
- 单位上海交通大学
