House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly

作者：Abizada, Azar^*; Chen, Siwei

来源：Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, 81: 29-37.

DOI：10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.002

• STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOCATION
• DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
• INDIVISIBLE GOODS
• MONOTONICITY
• CONSISTENCY
• PREFERENCES
• DIVISION
• RESOURCE
• TAXATION
• RULE

We study the problem of allocating a set of objects, e.g. houses, tasks, offices to a group of people having preferences over these objects. For various reasons, there may be more or fewer objects than initially planned and allocated. How should such unexpected changes be handled? One way is to declare the initial decision irrelevant and reallocate all available objects. Alternatively, one can use the initial decision as starting point in allocating the new objects. Since both perspectives seem equally reasonable, a natural robustness principle on the rule is that it should produce the same outcome no matter which one is taken. We define two robustness properties based on this idea, pertaining to more objects and fewer objects, respectively. @@@ We characterize the family of rules that satisfy mild efficiency, fairness and incentives requirements, together with either one of our robustness properties. They are the family of serial dictatorship rules.

• 出版日期2016-5
• 单位中山大学