Auctions with selective entry

作者：Gentry, Matthew^*; Li, Tong; Lu, Jingfeng

来源：Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 105: 104-111.

DOI：10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.016

• Auctions
• Endogenous participation
• Mechanism design

We consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. We characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of standard auctions within this framework, in the process extending the classic revenue equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and efficiency, showing that a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both higher-than-efficient reservation prices and higher-than-efficient entry fees.

• 出版日期2017-9
• 单位北京航空航天大学