A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring

作者：Aiba Katsuhiko^*

来源：Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 86: 58-66.

DOI：10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.007

• Stochastic games
• Private monitoring
• Folk theorem

We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. This asymptotic state independence holds, for example, for irreducible stochastic games. Our result establishes that the sophisticated construction of Horner and Olszewski (2006) for repeated games can be adapted to stochastic games, reinforcing our conviction that much knowledge and intuition about repeated games carries over to the analysis of irreducible stochastic games.

• 出版日期2014-7