Determinants of the floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms

作者：Chava Sudheer; Purnanandam Amiyatosh^*

来源：Journal of Financial Economics, 2007, 85(3): 755-786.

DOI：10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.06.004

• floating-to-fixed rate debt structure
• managerial incentives
• corporate governance
• monitoring
• derivatives

We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, firm characteristics and market timing on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that chief financial officer's (CFO's), not chief executive officer's (CEO's), incentive has a strong influence on firm's debt structure. When CFOs have incentives to increase (decrease) firm risk, firms obtain volatility-increasing (-decreasing) debt structure. These effects are present only for CFOs who are not subject to high monitoring by board members, CEOs, or corporate control market. Our findings suggest that agency problems at the level of non-CEO executives could be an important driver of various corporate decisions.

• 出版日期2007-9