About the power to enforce and prevent consensus by manipulating communication rules

作者：Lorenz Jan^*; Urbig Diemo

来源：Advances in Complex Systems, 2007, 10(2): 251-269.

DOI：10.1142/S0219525907000982

• continuous opinion dynamics
• bounded confidence
• communication structure
• balancing agents
• curious agents

We explore the possibilities of enforcing and preventing consensus in continuous opinion dynamics that result from modi. cations in the communication rules. We refer to the model of Weisbuch and Deffuant, where n agents adjust their continuous opinions as a result of random pairwise encounters whenever their opinions differ not more than a given bound of confidence epsilon. A high epsilon leads to consensus, while a lower epsilon leads to a fragmentation into several opinion clusters. We drop the random encounter assumption and ask: How small may epsilon be such that consensus is still possible with a certain communication plan for the entire group? Mathematical analysis shows that epsilon may be significantly smaller than in the random pairwise case. On the other hand, we ask: How large may e be such that preventing consensus is still possible? In answering this question, we prove Fortunato's simulation result that consensus cannot be prevented for epsilon > 0.5 for large groups. Next, we consider opinion dynamics under different individual strategies and examine their power to increase the chances of consensus. One result is that balancing agents increase chances of consensus, especially if the agents are cautious in adapting their opinions. However, curious agents increase chances of consensus only if those agents are not cautious in adapting their opinions.

• 出版日期2007-6