Neighborhood effects and social behavior: The case of irrigated and rainfed farmers in Bohol, the Philippines

作者：Tsusaka Takuji W^*; Kajisa Kei; Pede Valerien O; Aoyagi Keitaro

来源：Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, 118: 227-246.

DOI：10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.022

• Behavioral games
• Spatial econometrics
• Dictator game
• Public goods game
• Irrigation
• Social norms

Artifactual field experiments, spatial econometrics, and household surveys are combined in a single study to investigate the neighborhood effects of social behaviors. The dictator and public goods games are conducted among rice farmers in irrigated and non-irrigated areas in the Philippines. We find the neighborhood effects but the magnitude and statistical significance of endogenous social effects vary with the irrigation availability, type of social behavior, and type of neighborhood. Altruistic and cooperative behaviors are significantly influenced by the behaviors of neighbors only in the irrigated area, where social ties are strengthened through collective irrigation management. Through this effect, irrigated farmers' social behaviors become similar to those of one another. Neighborhood effects for cooperative behavior are stronger among farm plot neighbors than among residential neighbors, which may reflect their interactions in irrigation management. Although non-dynamic, these findings are consistent with the theory of social norm evolution through common pool resource management.

• 出版日期2015-10
• 单位中国水稻研究所