MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS

作者：Rao Congjun^*; Zhao Yong

来源：International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making, 2010, 9(5): 831-845.

DOI：10.1142/S0219622010004044

• Divisible goods auction
• optimal auction
• uniform price
• allocation of TPPDC

In this paper, the auction of divisible goods is investigated and a mechanism design method for optimal auction of divisible goods is presented. First, the definitions of feasible allocations and divisible goods auctions are given based on several important assumptions of divisible goods auction. Second, an optimal auction mechanism of divisible goods is designed, and a method of how to use the uniform price auction to implement the optimal auctions is discussed under the background of allocating the total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC). Lastly, this method is applied to the environmental planning of Wuhan City Circle in Hubei Province, China.

• 出版日期2010-9
• 单位黄冈师范学院; 华中科技大学